Allowing resale in multi-object auctions increases bidders. incentives to jointly reduce demand, because resale increases low-value bidders' willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders' willingness to pay. Therefore (unlike in single-object auctions), resale may reduce the seller's revenue in multi-object auctions. However, we show that, under reasonable conditions, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are "complement strategies" for the seller -by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by selling the objects separately and/or not allowing resale. We also analyze how resale affects a bidder's incentive to unilaterally reduce demand, and we show why allowing resale may reduce efficiency.
Introduction
The 2002 "Cave Report,"which was commissioned by the UK Government to review its spectrum policies, recommended to allow trading of spectrum licenses "as soon as possible." 1 Since 2003, the US Federal Communications Commission allows leasing and trading of the spectrum licenses it awards. The main rationale for this policy is that trading favors a more e¢ cient allocation of the spectrum among its users. In this paper we analyze how bidders'strategies in multi-object auctions are a¤ected by the possibility of trading in the aftermarket the objects acquired in the auction, and the e¤ect of this possibility on the seller's revenue.
When an auction is followed by a resale market, a losing bidder can still obtain the auction prize by purchasing it from a winning bidder. In single-object auctions, if bidders' relative valuations are known, the possibility of resale increases the seller's revenue because it gives a weak (i.e., low-value) bidder a chance to win the auction against a strong (i.e., high-value) bidder, and so it induces him to participate in the auction and bid more aggressively (Pagnozzi, 2008) . 2 But in multi-object auctions bidders may also have an incentive to "reduce demand" -i.e., to bid for fewer objects than they actually want, in order to pay a lower price for the objects they do win. Demand reduction typically reduces the seller's revenue and results in an ine¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale (Wilson, 1979) . 3 But while demand reduction is generally pro…table for a weak bidder -because he cannot win the auction if a higher-value competitor bids aggressively for all the objects on sale -a strong bidder may instead prefer to win more objects rather than reduce demand, even at the cost of paying a higher price for them. Therefore, when an auction is not followed by a resale market, demand reduction does not necessarily take place.
However, if the objects on sale are ine¢ ciently allocated as a consequence of demand reduction, it is natural to expect bidders to trade among themselves in the aftermarket, if they are allowed to do so. 4 Speci…cally, if trading in the aftermarket is allowed and a low-value bidder 1 The "Review of Radio Spectrum Management"was commissioned to Professor Martin Cave and also suggests that auctions should become the "default means" of assigning spectrum licenses. 2 The literature on resale in single-object auctions includes Calzolari and Pavan (2006) , Garratt and Tröger (2006) , Gupta and Lebrun (1999) , Hafalir and Krishna (2007) , Haile (2000 Haile ( , 2003 , Milgrom (1987) , and Zheng (2002) . 3 The literature on demand reduction also includes Ausubel and Cramton (1998), Back and Zender (1993) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), Kremer and Nyborg (2004) , and Noussair (1995) . Kagel and Levin (2001) and List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) provide experimental evidence of demand reduction; Weber (1997) , Wolfram (1998) and Wolak (2003) show that demand reduction a¤ected several FCC spectrum auctions, as well as the UK and the California electricity markets; Klemperer (2004) and Grimm et al. (2003) describe demand reduction in the 1999 GSM spectrum auction in Germany. Milgrom (2004) provides an excellent exposition of the literature on multi-unit auctions. 4 Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and Bose and Deltas (2002) show that bidders may also trade in the aftermarket when some bidders cannot participate in the auction and can only acquire the objects on sale in the wins an object, he can resell it to a high-value bidder who reduced demand during the auction, with both bidders making a pro…t. So resale allows bidders to correct an ine¢ cient allocation obtained at the end of the auction because of demand reduction, and hence it a¤ects a strong bidder's incentive to reduce demand.
When resale is allowed, a weak bidder is willing to pay a higher price in the auction (than when resale in not allowed) because he anticipates a positive surplus in the resale market if he wins an object in the auction; while a strong bidder is willing to pay a lower price in the auction (than when resale in not allowed) because she anticipates a positive surplus in the resale market if she loses an object in the auction. It follows that, when resale is allowed, for a strong bidder it is both more costly to outbid a weaker competitor, because the latter is willing to bid more aggressively, and less costly to lose an object in the auction, because the strong bidder can still acquire the object in the resale market. So the possibility of resale makes joint demand reduction -i.e., all bidders simultaneously reducing demand -more attractive for bidders.
We show that, in a uniform-price auction with complete information, while demand reduction is not always an equilibrium when resale is not allowed, when resale is allowed demand reduction is always an equilibrium (and it is the is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in undominated strategies). So allowing resale may induce bidders to reduce demand, thus reducing the seller's revenue. 5 Uniform-price auctions are often used to allocate multiple identical objects -for example, for on-line IPOs (including the one of Google in August 2004), electricity markets, markets for emission permits, and by the US Treasury Department to issue new securities. We analyze uniform-price auctions for simplicity, because this is the auction mechanism in which the incentive to reduce demand arises more clearly (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . But our qualitative result that resale may reduce the seller's revenue by making demand reduction more attractive for bidders also hold for any mechanism to allocate multiple objects in which bidders face a trade-o¤ between winning more objects and paying lower prices. As explained above, the reason is that, by nearing bidders'actual valuations, resale makes it relatively more costly for a bidder to outbid his competitors and win more of the objects on sale.
How can the seller react to the risk of demand reduction in an auction? Bundling the objects on sale appears a natural strategy for the seller, because bundling forces bidders to win all objects, or none at all. So bundling makes it impossible for bidders to pro…tably reduce demand (Anton and Yao, 1992) . Unfortunately, bundling may also reduce the seller's revenue and generate an ine¢ cient allocation. This happens whenever bidders do not reduce demand if aftermarket.
5 Pagnozzi (2007) analyzes how resale a¤ects the seller's revenue when it also attracts speculators -i.e., bidders who have no use value for the objects on sale -to the auction and shows that, because it increases the number of competitors in the auction, in this case allowing resale may actually increase the seller's revenue. the objects are sold separately. But we show that, while bundling has an ambiguous e¤ect on the seller's revenue when resale is forbidden, when resale is allowed bundling always increases the seller's revenue in our simple model, because bidders always reduce demand if resale is allowed and the objects are sold separately. 6 Moreover, we also show that, provided bidders are not too asymmetric, bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale are "complement strategies" for the seller -by both bundling and allowing resale the seller also earns a higher revenue than:
(i) by bundling and forbidding resale, and (ii) by not bundling and forbidding resale. 7 The reason is that by allowing resale the seller induces a weak bidder to bid more aggressively (as in a single-object auction) for both objects and, at the same time, by bundling the units on sale he prevents a strong bidder from reacting by reducing demand.
So our analysis suggests that a seller may prefer to bundle the objects on sale in order to increase his revenue, even if bundling may generate an ine¢ cient initial allocation of the objects. And this is especially true when the seller cannot prevent resale. Moreover, if resale is allowed and there are no frictions to trading in the aftermarket, resale eventually allows bidders to correct an ine¢ cient allocation achieved by the auction (e.g., because of bundling), and so ensures that the …nal allocation of the objects on sale is e¢ cient.
However, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient -because, for example, bidders may be unable to trade after the auction even if they would like to -allowing resale may actually result in an ine¢ cient …nal allocation of the objects on sale. The reason is that allowing resale may still induce a strong bidder to reduce demand, only then to …nd herself unable to acquire the object from a weaker bidder in the resale market.
Finally, we also analyze unilateral demand reduction by a strong bidder -i.e., the possibility that a bidder reduces demand alone, even though her opponent does not reduce demand. We show that resale may eliminate the incentive for a strong bidder to unilaterally reduce demand, because resale induces a weak bidder to bid relatively more aggressively on a marginal object, thus increasing the auction price when only the strong bidder reduces demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 introduces demand reduction without resale and Section 4 analyzes how demand reduction is 6 The e¤ects of bundling by a seller of multiple objects in an auction without resale have been analyzed by Anton and Yao (1992) and Palfrey (1983) , among others. Anton and Yao (1992) show that auctioning the objects on sale separately can reduce the seller's revenue because it allows bidders to coordinate their bids and accommodate each other. Palfrey (1983) shows that, when bidders are privately informed about their valuations, the seller's bundling decision is a¤ected by the number of bidders: bundling increases the seller's revenue with a small number of bidders but reduces the seller's revenue with a large number of bidders. 7 More precisely, bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale always yields a higher seller's revenue than bundling the objects on sale and forbidding resale; while bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale yields a higher seller's revenue than selling the objects separately and forbidding resale if either (1) the weak bidder has a su¢ ciently high valuation for at least one of the objects on sale or (2) the strong bidder does not obtain too large a share of the gains from trade in the resale market. 4 a¤ected by the possibility of resale. The e¤ect on the seller's revenue of bundling the objects on sale is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 considers the e¤ects of an ine¢ cient resale market, and Section 7 analyzes unilateral demand reduction. The last section concludes. All proofs are the appendix.
The Model
Consider a sealed-bid uniform-price auction for two units of the same good with two bidders. This is the simplest model that allows us to analyze the e¤ects of interest. Each bidder submits two non-negative bids, one for each unit. In a uniform-price auction, the two highest bids are awarded the units, and the winner(s) pay for each unit won a price equal to the third-highest bid.
We let v k i be bidder i's valuation for the k th unit he acquires. Bidder S is a strong (i.e., high-value) female bidder who has the highest valuation for one of the units on sale, while bidder W is a weak (i.e., low-value) male bidder. 
Notice that no bidder necessarily has the highest valuation for both units (i.e., each bidder may have one of the two highest valuations).
We make the following assumption on valuations, which is standard in the literature on demand reduction (e.g., Wilson, 1979) . To analyze the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase his revenue, we assume the seller can allow or forbid resale and bundle the units on sale or sell them separately.
If resale is allowed, bidders always trade in the aftermarket when there are gains from trade obtainable. Therefore, the outcome of bargaining between the two bidders in the resale market is given by the Nash bargaining solution with weights and (1 ), where the disagreement point is represented by bidders' outside options. The parameter is a measure of bidders'bargaining power. We assume that > 0 (i.e., that the weak bidder always obtains at least some of the gains from trade) in order to make the resale market relevant. When bidders trade a unit in the resale market, the outside option of the bidder who is trying to acquire the unit is normalized to zero, while the outside option of the bidder who won the unit in the auction is equal to his valuation. So a bidder's valuation is relevant in the resale market and also a¤ects his bargaining power. This implies that the gains from trading a unit in the resale market are equal to the di¤erence between the two bidders'valuations, and that the resale price is located somewhere between the two bidders'valuations, with the exact position determined by .
We de…ne a bidder's "willingness to pay" for a unit in the auction as the highest auction price the bidder is happy to pay for the unit. When resale is not allowed, a bidder's willingness to pay is equal to his valuation. When resale is allowed, a bidder's willingness to pay for a unit is represented by the price at which he can buy or sell the unit in the resale market (e.g., Milgrom, 1987 ).
In the auction, a strategy for bidder i is a vector b i = b 1 i ; b 2 i , where b 1 i is bidder i's bid for the …rst unit and b 2 i is his bid for the second unit, i = S; W . We assume that participating in the auction and bidding are costless and we only consider undominated strategies. We say there is demand reduction if a bidder's bid for a unit is lower than his willingness to pay for the unit.
We make the following assumption that requires that the quantity demanded by a bidder is not increasing in price:
Assumption 3. The bids of bidder i for the two units must be such that
Bidders jointly reduce demand if, for the second unit on sale, they both bid a price which is lower than their willingness to pay (for the second unit) and lower than their opponent's willingness to pay for the …rst unit. As we are going to show, when bidders jointly reduce demand each bidder wins one of the units on sale and the auction price is equal to the highest between the two bidders'bids for the second unit. 8 To simplify the analysis, we assume that, if in equilibrium bidders jointly reduce demand, they both bid zero for the second unit on sale -i.e., they coordinate on the equilibrium with joint demand reduction that gives them the highest pro…t, which is the equilibrium with an auction price equal to zero. This is a natural assumption because such an equilibrium Pareto dominates, from the bidders'point of view, any other equilibrium with joint demand reduction but a positive auction price. 9 Our results do not hinge on this assumption.
Finally, we make the following assumptions that simpli…es the description of equilibrium bidding strategies.
Assumption 4. When indi¤ erent between bidding a price equal to his willingness to pay for a unit and bidding a di¤ erent price, a bidder bids a price equal to his willingness to pay.
Assumption 5. When indi¤ erent between reducing demand and not reducing demand, a bidder reduces demand.
None of our results hinge on these assumptions.
In Section 6, to analyze the e¤ects of an ine¢ cient resale market, we assume that with positive probability bidders are unable to trade after the auction. In Section 7, to simplify the analysis of unilateral demand reduction, we further assume that there is an arbitrarily small cost that bidders have to pay to trade in the resale market.
Equilibria without Resale
It is well known that, in a uniform-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his valuation for the …rst unit (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004) ; hence bidders never reduce demand for the …rst unit. 10 Moreover, bidding more than one's willingness to pay for any unit is a weakly dominated strategy; hence 11 But bidders may …nd it pro…table to reduce demand and bid less than their willingness to pay for the second unit, in order to pay a lower price for the …rst unit and so obtain a higher pro…t (Wilson, 1979; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . The logic is the same as the standard textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit increases the price paid for the …rst, inframarginal, unit.
In this section, we assume that the seller does not allow resale after the auction. In this case, a bidder's willingness to pay is equal to his valuation for a unit. We analyze the conditions 9 An equilibrium Pareto dominates another equilibrium from the bidders'point of view if in the …rst equilibrium at least one bidder is strictly better o¤ and no bidder is worse o¤ than in the second equilibrium.
1 0 A bidder's …rst-unit bid a¤ects the auction price only when it is the third-highest bid, in which case the bidder wins no unit and the price is irrelevant to her. Therefore, the …rst-unit bid only determines whether a bidder wins the unit, and not the price she pays for it. And exactly as in a single-unit second-price auction, it is a dominant strategy for a bidder to bid her valuation for the …rst unit, so that she wins the unit if and only if it is pro…table for her to do so -i.e., if and only if her valuation is no lower than the auction price. 1 1 Because we exclude dominated strategies, we do not consider equilibria in which one bidder reduces demand because her opponent bids a very high price, higher than his own willingness to pay for a unit, expecting not to pay for it.
required for a Nash equilibrium with joint demand reduction in undominated strategies, in which both bidders bid zero for the second unit on sale in the auction.
, each bidder has one of the two highest valuations. In this case, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder to reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit, when her opponent bids his valuation for the …rst unit. The reason is that each bidder always wins a single unit (because her valuation for the second unit is lower than her opponent's valuation, and hence than his bid, for the …rst unit); hence the second-unit bid only a¤ects the auction price and each bidder is better o¤ making the lowest possible bid for the second unit. Therefore, joint demand reduction is the unique equilibrium that do not involve dominated strategies.
First notice that it is still a weakly dominant strategy for bidder W to reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit. This is because bidder W can never win more than one unit (because his valuation for the second unit is lower than bidder S's bid for the …rst unit). Therefore, even in this case bidder W 's bid for the second unit can only a¤ect the price he pays, and not whether he wins the second unit or not.
So whether joint demand reduction is an equilibrium crucially depends on bidder S. If she does not reduces demand, bidder S wins both units at price v 1 W each (which is bidder W 's bid for the …rst unit), and obtains a pro…t of
While, if bidder S reduces demand too, she wins one unit at price zero and obtains a pro…t of v 1 S . Therefore, bidder S prefers to reduce demand together with bidder W if and only if 2v 1
Lemma 1. Consider a uniform-price auction in which resale is not allowed.
S , the unique equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is for bidder S to bid b S = v 1 S ; 0 and for bidder W to bid b W = v 1 W ; 0 -i.e., joint demand reduction. Moreover, this is also the Pareto dominant equilibrium for bidders.
(ii) If v 2 S > 2v 1 W , the unique equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies and satis…es Assumption 4 is for bidder S to bid
Notice that Assumption 4 allows us to neglect other equilibria in undominated strategies that are essentially identical to the equilibrium in part (ii) of Lemma 1 (because, given bidder W 's strategy, bidder S is perfectly indi¤erent between bidding any price higher than v 1 W for the second unit).
S , there are multiple equilibria that result in di¤erent outcomes. For example, depending on bidders'valuations, the auction may also have an equilibrium in which both bidders bid their valuations for both units on sale and bidder S wins two units. However, this equilibrium
No Demand Reduction W the auction has the "joint demand reduction" equilibrium described in Lemma 1. Bidder S wins both units on sale in equilibrium if and only if she has a much higher valuation than bidder W for both units on sale, so that she prefers to win two units at a higher price, rather than reduce demand to one unit and keep the auction price low. Otherwise, bidders jointly reduce demand and each of them wins one of the units on sale at price zero.
In other words, joint demand reduction takes place in equilibrium if bidders are relatively symmetric and their valuations are not too far from each other -i.e., demand reduction requires bidder W to have a relatively high valuation for the …rst unit and bidder S to have a relatively low valuation for the second unit. In this case, even if bidder S has the highest valuation for both units, it is not pro…table for bidder S to win the second unit because she has to pay a high price to outbid bidder W in the auction, and the second unit is not particularly valuable for her anyway. So bidder S prefers to keep the auction price low by allowing bidder W to win one of 9 the units on sale. Notice that demand reduction is always an equilibrium if the units on sale are perfectly divisible and bidders can submit continuous bids (see Wilson, 1979 , who considers the case of common values). By contrast, in our model demand reduction is not always an equilibrium because quantities and bids are discrete -i.e., bidders submit a …nite number of price-quantity pairs rather than a continuous demand function (Kremer and Nyborg, 2004) .
Demand reduction harms the seller. If v 2 S > 2v 1 W , bidders do not reduce demand and the auction's price and the seller's revenue are equal to 2v 1 W -i.e., twice the third-highest valuation for a unit. 12 By contrast, if 2v 1
S , both bidders reduce demand to one unit, and the seller's revenue is equal to zero. However, with demand reduction, the auctions ends with an ine¢ cient allocation of the units, and bidders are willing to trade among themselves after the auction.
This may a¤ect the seller's revenue because, as we are going to show in the next section, a bidder's incentive to reduce demand in the auction depends on whether he can acquire in the aftermarket a unit that he loses in the auction to a bidder with a lower valuation.
Resale and Demand Reduction
After the auction, there are gains from trade whenever a bidder wins a unit on sale even if his opponent has a higher valuation. In this case, if resale is allowed, the auction winner resells the unit to the loser, and bidders equally share the gains from trade. Therefore, bidders'willingness to pay in the auction depends on the price at which they can acquire or resell a unit in the aftermarket.
If bidder W wins both units on sale, he always resells the second unit to bidder S at price
W (since bidder W obtains a share of the gains from trade). So this is the price at which bidder S can acquire the …rst unit in the aftermarket.
What about the other unit? First assume that v 2 S > v 1 W . If bidder W wins one unit, he resells it to bidder S at price v 2 S +(1 ) v 1 W . So this is the price at which bidder S can acquire the second unit in the aftermarket. While if bidder S wins both units, there is no trade in the aftermarket. Hence, when resale is allowed and v 2 S > v 1 W , bidders' total surplus as a function of the number of units they win in the auction (including the surplus they anticipate from the resale market and excluding the auction price) is equal to: 13 
No unit
One unit Two unit
If, on the other hand, v 2 S < v 1 W and bidder S wins both units, he resells the second one to bidder W at price
) of the gains from trade). So this is the price at which bidder W can acquire the second unit in the aftermarket. While there is no trade in the aftermarket if each bidder wins one unit.
Hence, when resale is allowed and v 2 S < v 1 W , bidders'total surplus as a function of the number of units they win in the auction (including the surplus they anticipate from the resale market and excluding the auction price) is equal to: 14 
One unit Two units
Bidders'marginal willingness to pay for a unit is given by the incremental value of obtaining a unit. So a bidder's willingness to pay in the auction for the k th unit is given by the di¤erence between his total surplus if he wins k units and his total surplus if he wins k 1 units, that is (both when v 2 S > v 1 W and when v 2 S < v 1 W ): 15 1 st unit 2 nd unit
Let p be the auction price per unit. If bidder W wins both units, bidder S acquires them in the aftermarket and obtains a total pro…t of v
2p from reselling the two units. If each bidder wins one unit, bidder S obtains a pro…t of v 2p; while bidder W obtains no pro…t. 1 4 If any bidder i wins two units, her total pro…t is equal to her valuation for the …rst unit (i.e., v 1 i ) minus the auction price, plus the price at which she resells the second unit to the other bidder in the aftermarket (i.e., v
If any bidder i wins no unit, she then buys one unit in the aftermarket and her total pro…t is equal to her valuation for the …rst unit (i.e., v 1 i ) minus the resale price at which she buys it from the other bidder (i.e., v
for bidder S). 1 5 Equivalently, bidders'willingness to pay can be obtained by noticing that a bidder who has a lower valuation than his opponent for a unit is willing to pay for that unit an auction price equal to the price at which he can resell the unit in the aftermarket; while a bidder who has a higher valuation than his opponent for a unit is willing to pay for that unit an auction price equal to the price at which she can buy the unit in the aftermarket.
Notice that the possibility of resale alters the structure of bidders'valuations. Indeed, due to resale: (i) one of the two bidders has a higher willingness to pay for the second unit than for the …rst unit (i.e., there are increasing marginal values), and (ii) regardless of bidders'valuations, no bidder has the highest willingness to pay for both units.
Recall from
e., joint demand reduction.
As in Lemma 1, the equilibrium with joint demand reduction and zero price Pareto dominates, from bidders' point of view, any other possible equilibrium in undominated strategies. 16 The reason is that, when joint demand reduction is an equilibrium, each bidder obtains a strictly higher pro…t by winning one unit at price zero, rather than by paying a positive auction price, even if this allows her to win both units on sale. Moreover, Assumption 4 allows us to neglect equilibria that are essentially identical to the equilibrium in Lemma 2, because, given their opponents' strategy, bidder S is indi¤erent between bidding any price S . But the possibility of resale increases bidder W 's willingness to pay for the …rst unit up to the price at which he can resell it in the aftermarket. And, at the same time, resale reduces bidder S's willingness to pay for the second unit, because bidder S has the option of buying the second unit in the aftermarket if she does not win it in the auction. 17 For both these reasons, demand reduction is more pro…table for bidder S.
So bidder S always prefers to win one unit in the auction at price zero and possibly purchase the second unit in the resale market, rather than raise the auction price to win both units in the auction. And clearly bidder W also prefers to win one unit in the auction at price zero and resell it in the aftermarket, rather than outbid bidder S and win two units (in which case he obtains a pro…t of zero on the second unit and reduces his pro…t on the …rst unit). Lemma As in a single-unit auction, resale induces a weak bidder to bid more aggressively (Pagnozzi, 2008) . But with multiple units on sale, this increases bidder S's incentive to reduce demand jointly with bidder W , because outbidding bidder W becomes more costly. And demand reduction reduces the seller's revenue. Moreover, resale makes an ine¢ cient allocation in the auction (i.e., bidder W winning a unit even if he has a lower valuation than bidder S) more attractive for bidders, because the ine¢ cient allocation can be recti…ed in the aftermarket.
. Without resale, bidder S prefers to outbid bidder W and win two units at price 2 each, rather than reduce demand and win one unit at price 0. So the seller's revenue is 4. With resale, bidder W is willing to pay up to 6 for the …rst unit and bidder S is willing to pay up to 5 for the …rst unit. Hence, it is an equilibrium for S to bid (5; 0) and for W to bid (6; 0), in which case each bidder wins one unit, the seller's revenue is 0 and bidder W resells to bidder S in the aftermarket at price 6. (If bidder S deviates and outbids bidder W to win 2 units in the auction, she raises the auction price to 6 and obtains a pro…t of 8 rather than 14.) Clearly, there is no other equilibrium in undominated strategies in which a bidder obtains a strictly higher total pro…t.
Bundling
Bundling the units on sale appears a natural reaction for the seller to the risk of demand reduction, because bundling makes it impossible for bidders to pro…tably reduce demand in the auction (see, e.g., Anton and Yao, 1992) . 18 However, as we are going to show, without resale bundling has an ambiguous e¤ect on the seller's revenue. In fact, when resale is not allowed, although bundling increases the seller's revenue if it prevents bidders from reducing demand, it reduces the seller's revenue if bidders do not reduce demand when the units are sold separately.
So should the seller bundle the units on sale when resale is allowed? And if the seller can credibly forbid resale, should he do so in order to prevent demand reduction by bidders? We address these questions in the following sections.
Bundling without Resale
First assume that resale is not allowed. If the two units are sold separately (as assumed in (In practice, in this case the seller runs a second-price auction for a single object.) Bundling a¤ects the seller's revenue when bidders do not reduce demand, because it makes the auction price for the two units depend on both bidder W 's valuations, rather than only on his highest one. However, bundling also eliminates bidders'incentives to reduce demand (Anton and Yao, 1992) . Speci…cally, when the units are bundled and resale is not allowed, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid the sum of his valuations for the two units, and the seller's revenue is equal to the lowest bid:
So without resale, bundling does not necessarily increase the seller's revenue: the e¤ect of bundling on the auction price depends on whether or not bidders jointly reduce demand when the units are sold separately (since 2v 1
. 1 8 In our analysis, we assume the seller's only available strategies are to bundle the units on sale and allow or forbid resale. This is an extreme assumption. If the seller knows the exact bidders'valuations and can set a reserve price, his optimal strategy is to set a reserve price equal to the highest bidders'valuations for the two units, thus obtaining the whole bidders' surplus. And even if the seller does not know the exact bidders' valuations, there are perhaps more complex mechanisms that would allow him to extract more of the bidders'surplus. But, in the real world, the seller's information is very uncertain, setting a credible reserve price is often extremely di¢ cult, and more complex mechanisms are even harder to implement.
Lemma 3. When resale is not allowed, bundling reduces (increases) the seller's revenue if v
2 S > 2v 1 W (2v 1 W v 2 S ) -i.e.,
if bidders do not reduce demand (reduce demand) without bundling.
In addition to its e¤ect on the auction price, another potential drawback of bundling is that it can reduce e¢ ciency. Indeed, bundling generates an ine¢ cient allocation of the units on sale if a bidder has a higher valuation than his opponent for one of the units, but a lower valuation for the bundle. In this case, when the units are bundled this bidder wins no unit, while it would be e¢ cient to award one unit to each bidder. 19;20
Bundling with Resale
Now consider the seller's revenue when resale is allowed. To make the analysis interesting, we assume that bidders can trade the two units separately in the resale market, even if the units are bundled in the auction. 21 Hence, if the seller bundles the two units and a bidder with a lower valuation than his opponent for any of the units wins the auction, the two bidders trade in the resale market.
When bidder S has the highest valuations for both units on sale, she can buy them in the resale market at prices v 1 S + (1 ) 
for the two units in the auction. And because it is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid her willingness to pay in the auction, the seller's revenue is also equal to:
By contrast, if the seller auctions the units separately and resale is allowed, by Lemma 2 both bidders reduce demand and the seller's revenue is equal to zero. Hence, we have the following result. 1 9 For example, bundling generates ine¢ ciency if v
S . In this case, bidder W wins none of the units on sale with bundling, while it would be e¢ cient for him to win one of the units.
2 0 Moreover, if there are entry or bidding costs, bundling may discourage the participation in the auction of the bidder with the lowest valuation for the bundle -while this bidder may participate if he could win a single unit. For example, Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) show that rationing -i.e., dividing the auction prize among multiple winners, which can be interpreted as selling the units separately in our model -may attract weak bidders to the auction and raise the auction price. See also Milgrom (2004) . 2 1 If the units cannot be sold separately in the resale market, our model is analogous to a single object auction with resale (see, e.g., Pagnozzi, 2008 ).
Lemma 4. When resale is allowed, bundling strictly increases the seller's revenue.
So, when resale is allowed, the seller always obtains a higher revenue by bundling the two units on sale, because bundling eliminates bidders' incentives to reduce demand, while this incentive is always present if the units are sold separately. In other words, in contrast to a situation in which resale is not allowed, when resale is allowed bundling is always an e¤ective strategy for the seller to prevent bidders from jointly reducing demand and to raise the auction price.
Bundling and Allowing Resale
Assume now that the seller can prevent bidders from reselling after the auction. Should the seller do so to discourage demand reduction or should he instead bundle the units on sale?
The answer is that, typically, the seller should not prevent resale and should bundle the units on sale, because bundling and allowing resale are complement strategies for the seller. Bundling the units on sale and allowing resale also yields a higher seller's revenue than selling the units separately and forbidding resale if:
The intuition is that, by simultaneously bundling the units on sale and allowing resale, the seller induces the bidder with the lowest valuation to bid more aggressively because of the option to resell in the aftermarket and, at the same time, he prevents the bidder with the highest valuation from reacting to this strategy by reducing demand. And even if bundling makes the auction price also depend on the weak bidder's lowest willingness to pay for a single unit, allowing resale increases this willingness to pay if the weak bidder has enough bargaining power in the resale market. Therefore, if bidders are not too asymmetric, the seller manages to obtain the advantages of both resale and bundling, without su¤ering from the drawbacks that these strategies may create.
Of course, if both bidder W 's valuations and his bargaining power in the resale market are much lower than bidder S's, bidder W is unable to obtain a large surplus by reselling to bidder S; hence allowing resale does not induce him to bid much more aggressively than without resale.
In this case, bundling and allowing resale may reduce the seller's revenue. The reason is that bidder S does not reduce demand when the units are sold separately and resale is not allowed, and bidder W 's marginal losing bid is higher when the units are sold separately and resale is not allowed than when the units are bundled and resale is allowed, because his marginal losing bid in the former situation only depends on his highest valuation (rather than on both his valuations) and the option to resell after the auction is not particularly valuable. But notice that condition 
. 22 As regards the additional potential drawback of bundling, even if bundling results in an ine¢ cient allocation in the auction, resale allows bidders to correct the allocation in the aftermarket and eventually achieve e¢ ciency. So resale also eliminates the risk of ine¢ ciency due to bundling. 23 
Ine¢ cient Resale Market
In Section 4, we have shown that resale may reduce the seller's revenue. However, it is usually claimed that the possibility of resale increases e¢ ciency, because it allows bidders to exploit further gains from trade after the auction, thus ensuring that the units on sale are e¢ ciently allocated eventually.
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the resale market is always e¢ cient, because bidders are capable of exploiting all pro…table trade opportunities after the auction. In this section we consider the possibility that the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient. Speci…cally, we assume that with a strictly positive probability (1 p) bidders are unable to trade after the auction -i.e., that bidders can only trade in the resale market with probability p < 1 if they are willing to do so. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that v 2 S > v 1 W , so that it is e¢ cient to allocate both units to bidder S. All other assumptions are as in our main model.
If bidder W wins one of the units on sale in the auction, with probability p he resells it to bidder S at price v 2 S + (1 ) v 1 W . And if bidder W also wins a second unit in the auction, 2 2 And the closer are bidder W 's valuations for the two units, the lower is the value of needed to satisfy condition (2). 2 3 If there are entry or bidding costs, even when resale is allowed bundling may prevent the participation in the auction of a weak bidder who expects to lose against a strong bidder. But because in this case the weak bidder participates only if he expects the strong bidder to reduce demand when the units are sold separately, even with bidding costs bundling does not reduce the seller's revenue when resale is allowed. with probability p he resells it to bidder S at price v 1 S + (1 ) v 2 W . Therefore, bidder W 's willingness to pay for the …rst unit in the auction is increased by an amount equal to his expected surplus in the resale market if he wins one unit -i.e., by the resale price minus his valuation for the …rst unit, v 2 S + (1 ) v 1 W v 1 W , times the probability that resale takes place, p. And bidder W 's willingness to pay for the second unit is increased by an amount equal to the surplus he expects to obtain from the second unit in the resale market -i.e., by the resale price minus his valuation for the second unit,
W , times the probability that resale takes place, p.
By contrast, bidder S's willingness to pay for the second unit in the auction is reduced by an amount equal to her expected surplus in the resale market if bidder W wins one uniti.e., by her valuation for the second unit minus the resale price, v 2
, times the probability that resale takes place, p. And bidder S's willingness to pay for the …rst unit is reduced by an amount equal to her additional expected surplus in the resale market if she does not win the …rst unit -i.e., by her valuation for the …rst unit minus the resale price,
, times the probability that resale takes place, p. Summing up, bidders'willingness to pay for each unit in the auction is equal to:
Compared to a situation in which bidders are always able to trade after the auction (i.e., p = 1), if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient bidder W is willing to pay a lower price in the auction while bidder S is willing to pay a higher price in the auction, because both bidders expect to obtain a lower surplus in the resale market. This reduces, but does not eliminate, bidder S's incentive to reduce demand and try to acquire one unit in the resale market. Speci…cally, bidder S still prefers to reduce demand and win only one unit in the auction at price zero rather than outbid bidder W to win two units, if the sum of her valuation for the …rst unit and her expected surplus in the resale market is higher than her pro…t from winning two units in the auction at the cost of rasing the auction price up to bidder W 's willingness to pay for the …rst unit.
Lemma 5. When resale is allowed but bidders are only able to trade after the auction with probability p, it is an equilibrium for bidder S to bid
.
Not surprisingly, demand reduction requires that the probability of ine¢ ciency in the resale market is not too large. Otherwise bidder S strictly prefers to outbid bidder W in the auction, rather than allow him to win one unit to keep the auction price low, in the hope of being able to acquire that unit in the resale market. Therefore, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient, it is less likely that bidders reduce demand and that the seller's revenue is reduced to zero.
However, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient, allowing resale may actually reduce e¢ ciency. To see this, recall from Section 3 that, when resale is not allowed, bidders do not reduce demand and the auction is e¢ cient if and only if v 2 S > 2v 1 W . But then in this case allowing resale may induce bidders to reduce demand during the auction, even if they may then be unable to trade in the resale market.
, allowing resale induces bidders to reduce demand and, with probability (1 p), it results in an ine¢ cient …nal allocation of the units on sale.
Therefore, it is not necessarily true that allowing resale increases e¢ ciency. Although resale may increase e¢ ciency after the auction, it also a¤ects bidders' strategies during the auction.
And allowing resale may result in an ine¢ cient allocation at the end of the auction, even when bidders may be unable to trade and achieve an e¢ cient allocation in the aftermarket.
Unilateral Demand Reduction
In this section, we analyze how resale a¤ects a strong bidder's incentive to unilaterally reduce demand -i.e., to bid zero for the second unit on sale -even if her opponent does not reduce demand and bids his willingness to pay for both units. Clearly, this is not an equilibrium strategy for the second bidder, because when a strong bidder reduces demand it is a best reply for a weak bidder to reduce demand too. However, in the real world bidders are often unable or unwilling to coordinate their strategy and simultaneously reduce demand, and cannot always act on the expectation that their opponents will reduce demand. 24 And there may also be exogenous reasons that induce a weak bidder not to reduce demand. So it is arguably worth considering the possibility of a unilateral choice to reduce demand by a bidder, when her opponent does not reduce demand, even if this assumes that her opponent does not follow a pro…t-maximizing strategy.
In order to explore this issue, we assume that v 2 S > v 1 W and that bidder W never reduces demand (i.e., that he follows a strategy of always bidding his willingness to pay for both units), and we analyze whether bidder S has an incentive to reduce demand unilaterally anyway.
We also assume there is an arbitrarily small …xed resale cost c that bidder S pays for each unit traded in the resale market. This can be interpreted as either a transaction cost or a waiting cost (due to discounting of future surplus) that a bidder pays if she buys a unit later in the resale market, rather than earlier in the auction. This assumption allows us to simplify the analysis because it implies that, for a given resale price, bidder S has a higher willingness to pay in the auction than bidder W . We assume that c 0, so that trading in the resale market is always pro…table after bidder W wins a unit in the auction.
With a resale cost, bidders willingness to pay in the auction is:
It may be expected that, when resale is allowed, unilateral demand reduction is more profitable for bidder S, because resale allows bidder S to purchase the second unit in the aftermarket if she does not win it during the auction. And, therefore, it may be expected that allowing resale always increases bidder S's incentive to unilaterally reduce demand. But this is not the case.
The reason is that resale increases bidder W 's willingness to pay for the second unit, and it increases it relatively more than his willingness to pay for the …rst unit, because bidder W can resell a second unit to bidder S at a high price (which depends on v 1 S ). It follows that, when resale is allowed, it is less pro…table for bidder S to unilaterally reduce demand, because when she does so she can only reduce the auction price down to bidder W 's bid for the second unit on sale, which is relatively higher due to his high willingness to pay. Lemma 6. Assume bidder W does not reduce demand. When resale is allowed, bidder S has no incentive to reduce demand unilaterally.
By contrast, when resale is not allowed, bidder S may strictly prefer to unilaterally reduce demand. To see this, assume that bidder W bids his valuation for both units -i.e., v The intuition for this result is that, when resale is not allowed, unilateral demand reduction by bidder S requires bidder W to have a relatively low willingness to pay for the second unit, because in this case bidder S can reduce the auction price by a large amount if she reduces demand, even if bidder W bids his valuation for both units. But the possibility of resale increases bidder W 's willingness to pay for the second unit; hence it may induce bidder S to increase her demand (when bidder W does not reduce demand). 25 Example 2. Assume v 1 S = 10, v 2 S = 6, v 1 W = 4, v 2 W = 0, and = 1 2 , and assume that bidder W bids his willingness to pay for both units. Without resale, bidder S prefers to unilaterally reduce demand (in order to obtain a pro…t of 10 rather than 8). With resale, bidder W is willing to pay up to 5 c for each unit. Therefore, bidder S can win two units in the auction and obtain pro…t 6 + 2c. If bidder S unilaterally reduces demand instead, she wins one unit at price 5 c in the auction and buys the second unit in the resale market at price 5, paying the cost c. Hence, she obtains a total pro…t of 6. So bidder S strictly prefers not to reduce demand unilaterally with resale.
Conclusions
It has been argued that resale should always be allowed because, by allowing bidders to exploit gains from trade after the auction, it favors an e¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale in the auction.
But resale also a¤ects bidding strategies during an auction. Resale increases the willingness to pay of a low-value bidder, because it gives him an option to resell in the aftermarket to a high-value bidder and, at the same time, resale reduces the willingness to pay of a high-value bidder, because it gives her an option to buy in the aftermarket a unit she loses in the auction.
When multiple units are on sale, this favors demand reduction by a high-value bidder. Therefore, unlike in single-unit auctions, resale may reduce the seller's revenue in multi-unit auctions.
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is a weakly dominant strategy for both bidders to bid their valuation for the …rst unit (e.g., Milgrom, 2004) . Given that bidder S makes her weakly dominant bid for the …rst unit, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder W to reduce demand and bid 0 for the second unit, because it is never pro…table for him to win two units (since bidder S's bid for the …rst unit is higher than bidder W 's valuation for the second unit) and, therefore, his second-unit's bid can only a¤ect the auction price.
When v 1 W > v 2 S , given that bidder W makes his weakly dominant bid for the …rst unit, it is also a weakly dominant strategy for bidder S to reduce demand and bid 0 for the second unit, because her second-unit's bid can only a¤ect the auction price. Therefore, the only equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is for both bidders to jointly reduce demand -i.e., for bidder S to bid v S there are also many other equilibria (that do not survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies). Speci…cally, it is an equilibrium for bidder S to bid v 1 S ; x and for bidder W to bid v 1 W ; x , 8x 2 0; v 2 W . But all these equilibria are Pareto dominated, from bidders'point of view, by the equilibrium with x = 0 -i.e., with joint demand reduction and an auction price equal to 0 -because both bidders win the same number of units in all these equilibria and only the auction price di¤ers. There may also be equilibria in which bidders S wins both units on sale. For example, when
, it is an equilibrium for each bidder to bid his valuations for both units on sale. But when 2v 1 W v 2 S these equilibria are Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with joint demand reduction and an auction price equal to 0, because bidder S prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder W .
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we are going to show that no bidder has a pro…table deviation from the equilibrium described in the statement both when v 2 S < v 1 W and when v 2 S v 1 W . In the candidate equilibrium, the auction price is equal to zero and both bidders win one unit. Notice that bids b 1
are not dominated, because they are not higher than bidders'willingness to pay. 26 Case (i): v 1 W > v 2 S . In this case no bidder resells the unit won in the auction and each bidder i obtains a pro…t equal to his valuation for the …rst unit, v 1 i . In order to win a second unit, a bidder has to raise the auction price for both units up to the price at which he will resell the second unit in the aftermarket. This reduces his pro…t. (And a bidders also earns a lower pro…t by winning no unit.) Hence, no bidder has an incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium.
Case (ii): v 2 S v 1 W . In this case bidder W resells the unit won in the auction and bidder S obtains a total pro…t of:
In order to win two units, bidder S has to pay an auction price of 2 b 1 W to outbid bidder W . In this case, she obtains a pro…t of:
Clearly:
Therefore, when condition A.1 is satis…ed, bidder S prefers not deviate from the equilibrium described by winning two units. Moreover, if bidder S wins no units, she earns a pro…t of
, which is also lower than S . So bidders S has no incentive to deviate.
In the candidate equilibrium, bidder W obtains a pro…t equal to the resale price at which he resells one unit to bidder S in the aftermarket, that is:
In order to win two units (that he resells to bidder S in the aftermarket), bidder W has to pay an auction price of 2 b 1 S to outbid bidder S in the auction. In this case, he obtains a pro…t of:
Therefore, when condition A.2 is satis…ed, bidder W prefers not deviate from the equilibrium described by winning two units. (Clearly, winning no units also yields a lower pro…t for bidder W .) So bidders W has no incentive to deviate either. By Assumption 4, being indi¤erent between any bid satisfying A.1 and A.2, bidders bid their willingness to pay for the …rst unit. This proves that the strategies described in the statement constitute an equilibrium satisfying Assumption 4.
Even when resale is allowed, the auction has other possible equilibria. However, by the same arguments of Lemma 1, all other equilibria are Pareto dominated, from bidders'point of view, by the equilibrium described, in which bidders jointly reduce demand and an auction price equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2, when resale is allowed bidders jointly reduce demand and the seller's revenue is equal to zero. By contrast, by Lemma 1, when resale is not allowed the seller's revenue is strictly positive when bidders do not reduce demand.
Proof of Lemma 3. Follows from the discussion preceding the statement. for the two units in the auction, which is the price at which she is indi¤erent between winning and losing. Hence, both bidders have exactly the same willingness to pay.
Since it is a weakly dominant strategy in a second-price auction to bid one's willingness to pay, it follows that the seller's revenue when resale is allowed and the units are bundled is equal to:
Assume now that resale is allowed and the units are sold separately. By Lemma 2, in this case bidders jointly reduce demand and the seller's revenue is equal to 0. This is lower than B R . In the candidate equilibrium, the auction price is equal to zero and each bidder wins one of the units on sale. Then, with probability p, bidder W resells his unit in the resale market at price v 2 S + (1 ) v 1 W . Hence, bidder S obtains a total expected pro…t of:
By contrast, if bidder S outbids bidder W , she wins two units but raises the auction price for both units up to bidder W 's bid for the …rst unit -i.e., v 1 W + p v 2 S v 1 W . Hence, her total pro…t is:
It follows that bidder S does not deviate from the strategies described if and only if:
In the candidate equilibrium described, with probability p bidder W obtains a surplus equal to the resale price at which he resells one unit to bidder S, and with probability (1 p) he obtains a surplus equal to his valuation. hence, her total expected pro…t is:
In order to outbid bidder S and win two units, bidder W has to raises the auction price up to v 1 bidders reduce demand when resale is allowed.
In this case, each bidder wins one unit but, with probability (1 p), bidders are unable to trade in the resale market and the allocation is ine¢ cient. We are going to prove that, if bidder W does not reduce demand, then bidder S has no incentive to reduce demand either. Firstly assume that x > y. Let b 1 W 2 [x + c; y + c] be bidder W 's bid for the …rst unit. Since bidder W has a higher willingness to pay for the second unit and she does not reduce demand, her bid for the second unit, b 2 W , is never lower than b 1 W . Bidder S can win two units in the auction at price b 1 W each. If instead bidder S unilaterally reduces demand, she wins one unit in the auction at price b 2 W and she purchases the second unit from bidder W in the resale market at price y, paying also the resale cost c. Therefore, bidder S strictly prefers not to reduce demand.
Secondly assume that x < y. Since bidder W does not reduce demand, he bids b W = (y c; x c). In this case, regardless of whether she reduces demand or not, bidder S always wins one unit in the auction (because her bid for the …rst unit is higher than bidder W 's bid for the second unit). If bidder S reduces demand, she buys the second unit in the resale market at price y, and also pays the resale cost c. Therefore, bidder S has no incentive to unilaterally reduce demand.
Proof of Proposition 4. Follows from Lemma 6 and the discussion preceding the statement.
